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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: AN ILLUSORY REMEDY FOR
GOVERNMENTAL OVERREACHING AT TRIAL
During a trial for manslaughter,' a prosecutor improperly ex-
pressed his opinion of the credibility of witnesses, argued facts to
the jury that were not in evidence,' and attempted to shift the bur-
den of proof of whether another person could have committed the
homicide4 to the defense. In another trial, the prosecution at-
tempted to admit fabricated evidence on a foundation of inadmis-
sible hearsay.5 At a third trial, a prosecutor read highly prejudicial
grand jury testimony to the jury over the defendant's continuing
objection." In each case the defense moved for a mistrial.7 If these
mistrials had been granted, would the Double Jeopardy Clause8
prohibit retrial?
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Dinitz9 that:
The double jeopardy clause does protect a defendant against governmental
actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defen-
dants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars
retrials where "bad-faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor" threatens the
"[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a
mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to con-
vict" the defendant.10
The prohibition against retrial when a mistrial motion by the
defendant is forced by governmental overreaching" originated as a
1. People v. Petrucelli, 44 A.D.2d 58, 59, 353 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (1st Dept. 1974).
2. Id. at 58, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
3. Id. at 59, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
4. Id. at 58, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
5. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1257 (5th Cir. 1976).
6. United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1977).
7. Id. at 137; United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d at 1257; Brief for Relator-Appellant at
2, People v. Petrucelli; appeal dismissed, 50 N.Y.2d 927 (1980).
8. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be
"subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
9. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
10. Id. at 611 (citations omitted).
11. The term "overreaching" was coined by Justice Harlan in United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971). Though he never expressly defined the term, he characterized the
circumstances as bad-faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor "designed to avoid an acquit-
tal." Id. at 485 n.12.
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limitation on the trial judge's broad discretion to declare a mis-
trial.12 Usually, retrial is permissible when the defendant's motion
for mistrial is granted."3 But when excessive prosecutorial or judi-
cial misconduct forces the defendant to move for a mistrial, the
policies behind the Double Jeopardy Clause14 should protect a de-
fendant from the unethical prosecutor or judge, who fearing ac-
quittal, attempts to abort the proceedings."
This Comment will explore the history of the prohibition
against retrial in cases of governmental overreaching: its develop-
ment in Double Jeopardy case law, and its application by the lower
courts. Recognizing that this relief is rarely given,"' the problems
in proving such a claim and the reluctance of the courts to grant
the remedy will be examined. Finally, the predicament of the de-
fendant whose mistrial motion is denied at the trial level will be
considered; the Double Jeopardy prohibition protects the defen-
dant's right to be judged by his first tribunal, 7 and, arguably, this
right has not been violated if the motion is denied, and the trial
proceeds to judgment. Finally, the possibility that the remedy is
12. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961), where the Court stated that
situations where "a judge exercises his authority to help the prosecution, at a trial in which
its case is going badly, by affording it another, more favorable opportunity to convict the
accused" by declaring a mistrial may be an abuse of the discretion vested and violate the
Fifth Amendment.
13. United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. at 485. This is because the defendant has
a significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from the
jury when circumstances occur which might be thought to warrant a declaration
of mistrial. Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial
or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily as-
sumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is
necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.
Id.
14. The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
15. See note 11 supra. A judge or prosecutor, who, fearing acquittal, engages in over-
reaching conduct, would be intending to end the present trial so as to retry the defendant,
gaining a more favorable forum for conviction. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
16. United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Kessler,
530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976) are the only cases where circuit courts have barred retrial.
17. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
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simply too drastic a remedy must be examined.
The general reluctance to prohibit retrial in cases of govern-
mental overreaching would indicate that courts are unwilling to
apply this drastic remedy without a resolution of the defendant's
guilt or innocence.18 Despite this, prosecutorial misconduct is an
alarmingly frequent basis for appeal by defendants. 19
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE "MANIFEST NEcEsSITY" STANDARD AND
THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION
When a defendant's trial is terminated prior to final judg-
ment,20 the policies and interests behind the double jeopardy pro-
hibition must be considered before retrial may be commenced. It is
recognized that numerous prosecutions increase the probability of
a defendant's eventual conviction, and unfairly burden the defen-
dant with expense and continued anxiety.2 1 The defendant's inter-
est has been called the right to be judged by his first tribunal. The
prosecution represents the public's interest in fair trials ending in
a judgment as to the guilt of the accused.2 2 Case law has developed -
that attempts a resolution of these competing interests where a
mistrial has occurred, or proceedings are terminated prior to final
judgment.
In United States v. Perez,2 3 the seminal case in the mistrial
context, a mistrial was declared due to a deadlocked jury.24 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit defendant's retrial.2 5 The Court stated that trial
court judges must have the "authority to discharge a jury from giv-
ing any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circum-
stances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
18. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
19. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 Tx. L.
REv. 629, 631 (1972).
20. Termination before final judgment can occur, for example, when a mistrial is de-
clared or the indictment is dismissed. For retrial to be prohibited, jeopardy must "attach,"
which occurs, in nonjury trials, after the first witness is sworn, Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377, 388 (1974), and in jury trials, when the jury is empaneled and sworn, Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978).
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689.





or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. ' 2 The
Perez standard of "manifest necessity" continues to govern mis-
trial declarations where a mistrial is requested by the prosecutor,
or declared sua sponte by the trial judge, without the defendant's
consent.1
7
Although the Perez standard was originally formulated to per-
mit retrial when a defendant's trial is aborted due to "unforesee-
able circumstances,"2 8 the standard has broadened considerably.2
Since the standard's application is at the discretion of the trial
court judge, "who is best situated to make such a decision,"80 the
Supreme Court has deferred to the judge's decision, repeatedly
stating that it will not develop "mechanical" rules that will inhibit
that discretion or application of the discretionary standard.31
Thus, manifest necessity no longer is found only if "unforeseeable
circumstances" or a "breakdown in judicial machinery" has oc-
cured; instead the decision to grant a mistrial must only be
"sound" to be justified under manifest necessity. 2 The result of
such a broad standard is that the societal interest in final judg-
ment usually prevails over a defendant's right to be judged by the
first tribunal.33
The Court has recognized that vesting such broad discretion in
the trial court judge can lead to abuse denying the defendant the
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Mistrials declared with
the purpose of harassing a defendant or giving the prosecution the
opportunity to find a more favorable forum for conviction violate
the Double Jeopardy prohibition. In Arizona v. Washington, the
26. Id.
27. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 481, 485.
28. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689; Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 372, 373
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 477 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Com-
pare United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) with Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497
(1978) and Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
30. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 368.
31. See id. at 367, and Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462.
32. Compare Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 and Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. at 372, 373 (Douglas, J., dissenting) with Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514.
33. See notes 29 & 32 and accompanying text supra; see also cases cited therein. Down-
urn, which prohibited retrial of the defendant, found that a mistrial declared due to the
absence of a prosecution witness did not constitute manifest necessity, 372 U.S. at 737-38.
The case has been restricted to its facts by the reasoning of Arizona v. Washington and
Illinois v. Somerville.
34. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. at 736.
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Court gave great deference to the trial court's decision but warned
that the "strictest scrutiny" would occur if a mistrial is declared
when "there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the state to harass or achieve a tactical ad-
vantage over the accused."3 5 The concept that prosecutorial or ju-
dicial "overreaching" at trial can implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause evolved as a limitation on the potential abuses inherent in
the broad grant of discretionary power to trial court judges.
II. RAMIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT's MOTION FOR MISTRIAL - THE
CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARNESS
When a defendant moves for a mistrial, retrial is normally
contemplated and is permissible.3 " It is recognized that a defen-
dant may not wish to continue a trial where error or prejudice has
occurred which may result in conviction and a lengthy appeal.3
Thus, the defendant voluntarily relinquishes his right to be judged
by the first tribunal by his mistrial motion.38
However, when governmental overreaching occurs at trial, and
the judge does not sua sponte declare a mistrial, the defendant
may be compelled to move for a mistrial. This places the defen-
dant in the untenable position of either moving for a mistrial when
he is not voluntarily relinquishing his right to be judged by the
first tribunal and being retried, or completing the trial, knowing he
will probably be convicted due to the prejudicial conduct.
The problem has evolved because the Court has found the de-
fendant to possess a significant interest in controlling the proceed-
ings. Thus, it is assumed that a defendant who moves for a mistrial
consents to reprosecution even if his motion "is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error."3 If the defendant does not move
for a mistrial, and gambles on his conviction, he cannot contend on
appeal that Double Jeopardy prohibits retrial because his right to
be judged by his first tribunal has not been violated.40 The Court
35. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 508.
36. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
37. Id.; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609.
38. Id. at 609-10.
39. See note 13 supra.
40. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467-68 n.4 (1964). In Tateo, the Court
stated that where a defendant was coerced into pleading guilty at his first trial, his right to
be judged by his first tribunal was not violated, 377 U.S. at 466-67, since "a defendant is no
1980]
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has not ignored this dilemma. Justice Harlan, in United States v.
Tateo and in United States v. Jorn, counseled defendants caught
in this predicament to make the mistrial motion,41 and stated that
where a defendant's motion is "necessitated by judicial or
prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, rep-
rosecution might well be barred.
42
In United States v. Dinitz, the Court elaborated on Justice
Harlan's dicta in Tateo and Jorn. The Circuit Court of Appeals
had held that a mistrial motion by a defendant barred retrial
where a defendant was compelled to move for a mistrial.43 Though
the defendant was not forced to make the motion due to govern-
mental overreaching, 44 the case is significant because the Supreme
Court refused to accept the Circuit Court's recognition of the
"Hobson's choice" faced by a defendant when forced to move for a
mistrial as invoking Double Jeopardy protection.45  The Court
stated that "the important consideration for the Double Jeopardy
Clause ' 48 is that the defendant retain control over the proceed-
ings. 47 The Court argued that acceptance of the Circuit's "waiver"
theory might cause trial judges to reject all defendants' mistrial
motions fearing that granting the request erroneously might place
the defendant beyond the reach of further prosecution.48
However, the Court recognized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause must protect against governmental actions intended to pro-
voke a mistrial motion from a defendant. For the first time, the
Court definitively stated that retrial would be barred where "bad-
less wronged by a jury finding of guilt after an unfair trial than by a failure to get a jury
verdict at all; the distinction between the two kinds of wrongs affords no sensible basis for
differentiation with regard to retrial." Id. at 467. As Justice Goldberg points out in his dis-
sent, the Court's reasoning ignores the fact that the right is important because of the possi-
bility of acquittal. 377 U.S. at 473-74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
41. See note 40 supra and United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484-85 nn.11 & 12.
42. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 n.12.
43. United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 600
(1976).
44. In Dinitz, a defense counsel was expelled from the courtroom for engaging in im-
proper conduct. When defendant's co-counsel stated he was not prepared to proceed, the
trial court gave the defendant three alternatives - a stay or recess pending appellate review
of the propriety of the expulsion, continuing the trial with co-counsel, or a mistrial. Defen-
dant moved for a mistrial. 424 U.S. at 611.
45. Id. at 609-10.
46. Id. at 609.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 610.
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faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor" threatens harassment of
the defendant by "successive prosecutions or declaration of a mis-
trial" so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable forum for
conviction.49 In Lee v. United States,0 the Court restated, and
conceivably expanded this rule. Applying Dinitz principles, the
Court stated that where errors which prompted the defendant's
motion were "intended to provoke" the motion or were otherwise
"motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice the
defendant, '51 retrial would be barred.
Analysis of the language employed by the Court in Lee raises
the question whether the Court was consciously expanding the cir-
cumstances where retrial would be barred. Justice Harlan, in Tateo
and Jorn, had stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause would only
bar retrial where the judge or prosecutor, fearing that the defen-
dant would be acquitted, performed the overreaching conduct and
obtained the mistrial to find a more favorable forum in which to
convict.5 2 Since the objective of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to
prevent successive prosecutions, 5 the strictest analysis of conduct
by the government seeking to provoke a mistrial would allow
Double Jeopardy protection for a defendant only when the conduct
is performed with the intention of gaining more time or another
tribunal more favorable to conviction." However, the language of
Lee could be an attempt by the Court to include those situations
where the conduct is performed with the intention of merely insur-
ing conviction. An intention to provoke a mistrial or a wish on the
49. Id. at 611.
50. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
51. Id. at 33-34. The defendant in Lee moved to dismiss a defective indictment before
jeopardy attached. The motion was tentatively denied, and then granted after jeopardy had
attached. 432 U.S. at 25-27. The defendant was retried and convicted. The Court affirmed
the conviction, holding Double Jeopardy did not bar retrial. Finding that the dismissal was
"functionally indistinguishable" from a mistrial declaration, since the trial court's order
contemplated reprosecution, 432 U.S. at 31, the defendant's motion was treated as a motion
for mistrial. Since no governmental overreaching by Dinitz principles had occurred, retrial
was not barred. 432 U.S. at 33-34.
Lee appears to stand for the proposition that negligent conduct by the government is
simply not sufficient to bar retrial. The error in drafting the information was characterized
as negligence "as prejudicial to the Government as to the defendant." Id. at 34. This error
was not "the product of the kind of overreaching outlined in Dinitz." Id.
52. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 n.12; United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 468
n.3.
53. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
54. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
part of the State to get a better day in court may not exist. Con-
duct motivated by bad faith, intended to harass or prejudice the
defendant in the eyes of the jury who will then convict, could,
under the language of Lee, be sufficient to bar retrial. But such
conduct, though thoroughly reprehensible, may not warrant
Double Jeopardy protection; the government is not attempting to
place the defendant in jeopardy again - they only wish to convict
him, not terminate the proceedings before judgment in order to
gain another forum.
It can be argued that the rule should be expanded to include
bad-faith conduct designed to convict. The defendant still must
make a mistrial motion to protect his rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Regardless of the intention of the judge or prose-
cutor, by making the motion, the defendant places himself in the
position of being retried if the motion is granted. His right to the
judgment of the first tribunal has been violated, and he is once
more in jeopardy.
Despite its theoretical appropriateness, the Court has not re-
lied on the expansive language of Lee. Instead, in Divans v. Cali-
fornia,5 5 and United States v. Scott,58 Justice Rehnquist cited only
the Dinitz dicta that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defen-
dant from retrial only when governmental actions occur that are
intended to provoke mistrial requests.51 Any reference to bad-faith
conduct was omitted.5 8 Under Justice Rehnquist's formulation,
only conduct performed with the strict intent of provoking the de-
fendant's motion in order to gain another forum would bar retrial.
Further, Justice Rehnquist's holding in Scott requires submission
of issues of factual guilt or innocence to a fact-finder prior to the
55. 434 U.S. 1303 (1977) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). Divans, denying a stay pending
certiorari, gave no facts. Justice Rehnquist relied on the trial court's finding that error oc-
curred, not conduct intended to force the mistrial motion. Id. Justice Rehnquist reiterated
this holding once again upon Divans' third application for a stay-
In the instant motion applicant contends that he has acquired still more
information demonstrating the prosecutor's bad faith. Applicant presents, how-
ever, only his own assertions to this effect, and none of the moving papers before
me contain any findings, which contradict the Superior Court's finding.., that
the prosecutor's error was not calculated to force applicant to move for a
mistrial
Divans v. California, 439 U.S. 1367, 1368 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
56. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
57. Id. at 94.
58. See cases cited in notes 55 & 56 supra.
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defendant's seeking termination of the proceedings.59 This concep-
tually links the "actual" guilt or innocence of the defendant to
whether or not the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial. The
right to be judged by the first tribunal would then only be signifi-
cant to the Court if they are confident of the defendant's inno-
cence. Such a linkage between factual guilt and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does not bode well for a defendant whose trial is
tainted by governmental overreaching - the issue should be the
government's conduct, not the defendant's.
III. THE PRINCIPLE AS APPLIED BY THE LOWER COURTS
Since Dinitz,60 many appeals by defendants have included a
claim that governmental overreaching occurred at trial, and the
appellate court should bar retrial.6 1 The Supreme Court, however,
never defined "overreaching"' 2 and the language of Lee implied, to
some courts, that there were two kinds of conduct that could be
found to reach the level that would bar retrial. The fact that the
principle has remained dicta,63 and that the Court had never en-
countered an illustrative factual situation of overreaching,6 left
59. Scott expressly overruled United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), another
Rehnquist opinion. Jenkins held that dismissal of an indictment after jeopardy had at-
tached was not appealable by the government if retrial of factual issues would be required
upon reversal and remand. Id. at 369-70. Rehnquist states in Scott that "Jenkins was
wrongly decided. It placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's right to
have his guilt decided by the first jury empaneled to try him.. . ." 437 U.S. at 86-87. Scott
held that where a defendant seeks to have his trial terminated without any submission to
either judge or jury of factual issues of guilt or innocence, an appeal by the government is
not barred. 437 U.S. at 101. Rehnquist found that since acquittals, which'he termed a fac-
tual resolution of the offense charged favoring the defendant, id. at 99, have historically
been the only bar to retrial, id. at 87-91, "legal claims," which cause the public to lose their
"right to convict those who have violated its laws," id. at 96, 100, do not bar retrial. The
dissenting justices were not convinced. They stated that historically or logically there is no
basic legal correlation between the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause and a defen-
dant's actual guilt or innocence. See id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
61. Over 100 cases in appellate courts were surveyed for this Comment.
62. See note 11 supra.
63. See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1977) (Henley, J., dis-
senting). Judge Henley stated that Lee, Dinitz and Jorn all "contain dicta" that
prosecutorial misconduct may bar retrial, but "the majority cites, and I can find, no Su-
preme Court case on appropriate facts holding that gross negligence or intentional
prosecutorial trial error not calculated to produce a mistrial" can bar retrial. Id. at 142.
64. In fact, Lee is essentially the only case where the Court has applied the principle,
and Lee only stated that the errors alleged were not overreaching conduct. See note 51
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the lower courts to apply a principle without any substantial gui-
dance from the Court.
Many courts disposed of the problem by simply stating that
the conduct complained of did not rise to the level of overreach-
ing. 65 Others reasoned that even though prejudicial conduct by the
government occurred, the defendant's mistrial motion was not pro-
voked by the conduct, but was made for other reasons. 66 Some
opinions stated that the defendants failed to prove actual
prejudice to their case resulting from the overreaching conduct.
'1
Others weighed the evidence against the defendant, reasoning that
a strong case would indicate that the prosecution did not need an-
other forum to convict the defendant.68
Most courts recognize that retrial should be barred where a
prosecutor or judge intentionally engages in overreaching conduct
to force the defendant to move for a mistrial thereby avoiding an
acquittal. 9 But such a case is rare; the dilemma arises for courts
attempting to apply the principle when it is unclear what moti-
vated the misconduct. Lee implied that bad-faith conduct would
also bar retrial, ° but courts are divided as to whether grossly neg-
ligent conduct by the prosecutor that provokes a mistrial motion
should bar retrial.71 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Kessler,
supra.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Heymann, 586 F.2d 1039, 1040 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ken-
nedy, 548 F.2d 607, 609 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mandel, 550 F.2d 1001, 1002
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. United States v. Brooks, 599 F.2d 943, 945 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Leo-
nard, 593 F.2d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311, 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Cerilli, 558 F.2d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1977); State v. Harrell, 85 Wis.2d 331, 339-40, 270
N.W.2d 428, 433-34 (1978); Commonwealth v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 189-91, 220 A.2d 859, 865
(1966).
67. United States v. Klande, 602 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Davis,
589 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979).
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 189-91, 220 A.2d 859, 865 (1966).
69. United States v. Leonard, 593 F.2d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589
F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1978); Moroyoqui v. United States,
570 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Baylor, 2 Kan. App. 2d 722, 587 P.2d 343, 346
(1978); State v. Harrell, 85 Wis.2d 331, 335, 270 N.W.2d 428, 431 (1978); City of Tucson v.
Valencia, 21 Ariz. App. 148, 517 P.2d 106, 111 (1973).
70. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
71. Compare United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d at 140 with Tabbs v. State, 43 Md.
App. 20, 403 A.2d 796 (1979).
1980] DOUBLE JEOPARDY
barred retrial where fabricated evidence had been admitted at trial
on a foundation of inadmissible hearsay.7 2 Finding that such mis-
conduct was intentional, the court, nevertheless, included in their
definition "grossly negligent conduct... which caused aggravated
circumstances to develop which seriously prejudices a defendant,
causing him to reasonably conclude that continuation of the
tainted proceeding would result in conviction, '73 a statement that
shows an extraordinary misreading of Dinitz.7"4 The Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Martin" barred retrial where prejudicial grand
jury testimony had been read to the jury over continuing objection,
and immediately thereafter, the defendant had moved for a mis-
trial.78 The court stated that this was grossly negligent conduct,
"best described as prosecutorial error undertaken to harass or
prejudice the defendant,"7" which left the defendant "no choice" 8
but to move for a mistrial. In both cases, the courts did not ex-
amine whether the government was intentionally trying to obtain a
more favorable forum for conviction or gain more time. 9 These
opinions have been criticized by other courts for failing to consider
that ultimately the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against
successive prosecutions.8 0 Critics .argue that a Double Jeopardy
72. United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d at 1257. In 1973, the Fifth Circuit first stated
that the misconduct provoking the mistrial motion could be either intentional or grossly
negligent and constitute overreaching. United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 1256-57.
74. The language cited in Kessler, which cites back to Dinitz, is exactly the opposite of
what the Supreme Court stated in Dinitz. The "reasonable conclusion" defendants drew,
that "continuation of the trial may lead to conviction," was the "Hobson's choice" that
defendants considered when making a mistrial motion due to error, not overreaching. The
Court recognized that it is truly a "Hobson's choice," but stated expressly that this interest
would not preclude retrial. Compare Kessler, 530 F.2d at 1256 with Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 409-
10.
75. 561 F.2d 135.
76. Id. at 137, 140.
77. Id. at 140.
78. Id.
79. See United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d at 1256; United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d at
140.
80. See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d at 141 (Henley, J., dissenting), where the
dissent states that retrial cannot be barred where the court does not find that the essential
design of the prosecution was to secure a more favorable forum. Tabbs v. State, 43 Md. App.
20, 403 A.2d 796 (1979) is a virtual treatise on the subject of why grossly negligent conduct
cannot constitute overreaching that bars retrial. Judge Moylan follows the principle through
Supreme Court case law, holds the Fifth Circuit cases up to an unforgiving light (exposing
the misreading in Kessler of Dinitz) and cites "The Great Weight of Authority in the State
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remedy is inappropriate where there has been no specific intent to
place the defendant in jeopardy. 1 Because gross negligence by its
terms lacks the intent to gain another forum, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apoly.
2
Kessler and Martin are the only cases where Circuit courts
have barred retrial due to overreaching conduct, though hundreds
of appeals have been filed stating the claim. 83 Most appeals en-
counter problems of proof, and the inescapable fact that prohibi-
tion of retrial is a drastic remedy which courts are loathe to em-
ploy unless the record of the trial below "shocks the conscience" of
the appellate court.
8 4
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF AND REMEDY
The burden of proving that governmental overreaching pro-
voked a defendant's mistrial motion lies with the defendant.8 5
Such a claim is extremely difficult to prove, because it requires
substantial documentation of misconduct at trial and because the
defendant must prove the state of mind of the judge or prosecutor.
The first hurdle is proof that the conduct rose to the level of
overreaching conduct. Prosecutorial misconduct will not serve as a
basis for barring retrial if it is viewed by an appellate court as sim-
ply error or mistake."6 The conduct must infer intention by the
prosecution or the court to secure another, more favorable tribu-
nal. Thus, a defendant has a second hurdle; besides establishing
overreaching conduct, he must show that this conduct- was per-
formed with the intention of forcing him to move for a mistrial.
87
Finally, he must establish that this overreaching forced him to
move for a mistrial.
In attacking the first obstacle, defendants should recognize
that prosecutors, though ethically interested in justice, are realisti-
Courts." He deals with the case-at bar in three paragraphs.
81. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 265-67, 386 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1978)
which expressly overruled Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977), which
had held that grossly negligent conduct could constitute overreaching barring retrial.
82. Id.
83. See Alschuler, supra note 18.
84. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
85. United States v. Rumpf, 576 F.2d 818, 823 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.
893 (1978).
86. See, e.g., id. at 822.
87. See cases cited in-note 69 supra.
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cally interested in winning their cases and gaining convictions, and
a single improper comment, question or reference will not be
viewed as overreaching conduct by an appellate court. Defendants
most often lose on appeal because the appellate court will not pro-
hibit retrial where a zealous prosecutor overstepped the bounds of
ethical conduct once or twice." The defense should document a
series of instances of improper conduct which constitute overreach-
ing when viewed as a whole. The best case establishes a series of
events where the conduct becomes more flagrant as the trial con-
tinues, buttressed with argument that this conduct occurred as the
prosecution's case deteriorated. 9 A defendant should also docu-
ment for the appellate court the prejudice that resulted to his case
due to the conduct, and the improbability of acquittal due to the
prosecution's actions.9 0
The second hurdle, proving the state of mind of the actor, is
crucial, and immensely difficult. Since the prohibition or retrial is
such a drastic remedy, many courts require clear and convincing
proof that the prosecution, by its conduct, was attempting to force
a mistrial. Once again, a carefully constructed argument, illustrat-
ing successive instances of misconduct will allow an appellate court
to infer the requisite intent.9 1 An ideal claim would expose a gov-
ernmental scheme to force a mistrial9 2 based on a crescendo of
events, with conduct that becomes more and more flagrant, until
the defendant moves for the mistrial.
Finally, a defendant must prove that his mistrial motion was
forced upon him by the conduct. Some courts view the totality of
the circumstances leading to the mistrial motion to determine
whether the motion was actually caused by the conduct.93 If other
factors are found that were not in the direct control of the prosecu-
tion, or if the mistrial motion does not appear provoked directly
88. United States v. Garza, 603 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kess-
ler, 530 F.2d at 1256.
90. United States v. Kande, 602 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. David,
589 F.2d at 906; Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d at 122.
91. See Brief for Relator-Appellant at 23, appeal dismissed, People v. Petrucelli, 50
N.Y.2d 927 (1980).
92. United States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d at 1249. In Nelson, this was the standard used by
the court to determine the claim.
93. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d at 547.




by conduct, the claim will fail."
The institutional problems faced by defendants seeking pro-
tection from the Double Jeopardy Clause are several. First, appel-
late courts have indicated reluctance to bar retrial in these circum-
stances, fearing that trial judges will begin to reject mistrial
motions by defendants because of the possible prohibition against
retrial."' Appellate courts also give great deference to the trial
judge's findings of fact concerning the mistrial, setting them aside
only if they appear clearly erroneous. But at the trial level, a judge
who has a continuing relationship with a prosecutor, may be loathe
to find that prosecutor guilty of overreaching on the record.97 Ap-
pellate courts will be equally as reluctant to characterize judicial
conduct as overreaching, due to the belief that fellow judges should
be protected by their brethren, and that open criticism of a judge
may lead to public disrespect for the judiciary as a whole.9 8 In ad-
dition, proof needed for the claim may be in the sole control of the
government,99 and tremendous difficulty can be expected if the de-
fendant attempts discovery of this evidence, if he is even aware of
its existence.100 Finally, it should be recognized that the defendant
is impugning the motives of the government in the same system
that injured him initially. He is asking the same institutional sys-
tem to recognize its misconduct and grant relief in the form of a
serious sanction.
The relief requested may be the reason why these claims usu-
ally fail. Since the clause bars retrial, the defendant's offense, no
matter how egregious, is being forgiven due to the excesses of the
state. Though appellate opinions have not expressed this as a rea-
95. United States v. Brooks, 599 F.2d at 945; United States v. Leonard, 593 F.2d at 954;
United States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d at 1249; United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d at 1318, 1320.
96. United States v. Garza, 603 F.2d at 581; United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d at 1321.
97. United States v. Phillips, 600 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Davis,
589 F.2d at 906; Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d at 864. The problem of institutional
relationships between judges and prosecutors was recognized by Justice Marshall in Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. at 482 n.1.
98. See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 687. Alschuler documents the fact that in appellate
opinions which reverse convictions due to judicial misconduct, the reason for reversal is
rarely stated in the opinion, and that this is the result of a "fraternal, protective spirit
among judges."
99. United States v. Rumpf, 576 F.2d at 823.
100. Cf. id., where the Court suggests that although the burden of proof lies with the




son for the denial of the claims, the fact that only two cases in the
circuit courts have barred retrial leads one to suspect that courts,
though acknowledging that governmental misconduct exists, be-
lieve that barring retrial is simply too drastic as a remedy. To
many appellate courts, allowing retrial appears as a more equitable
compromise. A defendant will finally receive a fair adjudication,
and the public interest is not completely frustrated.
A finding of misconduct and the granting of a new trial does
not adequately address the problem. It does not deter governmen-
tal misconduct, that appears to be occurring with alarming fre-
quency. 10 1 Nor does it eliminate the unfair burden on the defen-
dant which the Clause was specifically designed to prevent -
continued anxiety, humiliation and expense.10 2 Likewise, the de-
fendant's right to be judged by the first tribunal is ignored by the
compromise of retrial.
V. DENIAL OF MISTRIAL MOTION AND CONVICTION - PROBLEMS
OF APPELLATE REvIEw
The Supreme Court has considered only whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars retrial where a defendant's mistrial motion
due to governmental overreaching has been granted by the trial
judge.10 3 If the motion is denied, and the defendant is convicted,
the defendant's right to be judged by the first tribunal has not
been violated.' 4 Does the rendering of judgment alone justify
retrial?
Burks v. United States'0 5 provides reasoning to bar retrial in
such a situation. It held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
retrial when an appellate court finds that the evidence deduced at
trial is legally insufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. 06 The
appellate court had remanded the case for a directed judgment of
acquittal or a new trial, the defendant having requested retrial as
101. See note 18 and accompanying text supra; note 124 and accompanying text infra.
102. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
103. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
104. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466-68.
105. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
106. Id. at 15-16. Accord United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91-92. Justice Rehnquist
characterizes the holding of Burks as one of the "venerable principles of double jeopardy
jurisprudence" and states that this holding is the only basis for appeal by a defendant who
has been convicted which can bar retrial.
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one avenue of relief.'0 7 The defendant appealed the remand, argu-
ing that the appellate reversal of his conviction was the "operative
equivalent" of a trial court judgment of acquittal.'08 The Court
agreed, stating "[tlo hold otherwise would create a purely arbitrary
distinction between those in petitioner's position and others who
would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision by the District
Court.'"
09
Burks' reasoning could be employed by a convicted defendant
whose mistrial motion had been denied at trial.110 The threshold
argument could be that the trial court erred in denying the mis-
trial motion, and that if the appellate court found that the mistrial
motion by the defendant had been provoked by governmental
overreaching, the conviction should be reversed, and retrial
prohibited.
There is dicta in Burks, however, that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not violated if a conviction is reversed due to trial error
and retrial ordered."" Burks defined such a reversal as "a determi-
nation that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial pro-
cess which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect
receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or
prosecutorial misconduct.""1 2 Thus, a defendant who wishes to ar-
gue that if an appellate court finds that overreaching occurred
which provoked his mistrial motion, then a mistrial should have
been granted and double jeopardy should prohibit his retrial, will
have to combat the dicta of Burks, and the case law supporting the
dicta." A defendant encountering judicial overreaching may be
107. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 4.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 11. To reach this holding, the Court reviewed a line of case law that was
procedurally inconsistent upon disposition after appeal. Where defendants on appeal re-
quested retrial as alternative relief, they were retried after successful appeals; if retrial was
not requested, retrial still occurred in some cases. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416
(1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373
(1955); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). These cases are now overruled "to the
extent that our prior decisions suggest that by moving for a new trial, a defendant waives
his right to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency. ... 437 U.S.
at 18.
110. This argument has been made to appellate courts, but has not been successful.
See, e.g., Brief for Relator-Appellant, Petrucelli, supra note 91, at 20-21.
111. United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. at 13-15.
112. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
113. Burks states that the reversal due to trial error does not cause retrial to be barred
because such a reversal determines "nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
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caught in an impossible trap. A judge, engaging in overreaching
conduct, who merely wishes to insure conviction and not gain an-
other forum, is unlikely to grant a mistrial motion based on his
own overreaching conduct. Thus, the defendant is convicted, and
may fail on appeal due to the dicta of Burks expressing the holding
of United States v. Tateo,114 that retrial is not barred where rever-
sal is due to error in the proceedings.
No cases have been found where retrial has been barred after
a successful appeal of a conviction. Partly, this is because in the
vast majority of cases claiming prosecutorial overreaching, the ap-
pellate court assumes that if the mistrial motion was not granted
at trial, then the misconduct was not of sufficient gravity to war-
rant the remedy.11  There are, in addition, only a handful of cases
where judicial overreaching is alleged,116 and they do not establish
a pattern on appeal.
In summary, a defendant who is denied a mistrial declaration,
and is convicted, faces an additional problem upon appeal. Burks
states that the reason why reversal for trial error does not prohibit
retrial is that such a reversal determines "nothing with respect to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 11 7 Though it is difficult,
historically, to determine how the factual guilt or innocence of the
accused pertains to application of the Double Jeopardy Clause,118 a
defendant," id. at 15, unlike the reversal due to insufficient' evidence, the "operative
equivalent" of acquittal. Id. at 5.
114. 377 U.S. at 465. See note 40 supra for discussion of this case. This is one of the
cases relied upon by the Court in Burks for the dicta concerning reversals due to trial error.
437 U.S. at 14. Tateo, along with United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896), states that
the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by retrial of a defendant where the conviction is
reversed due to an error in the proceedings. 377 U.S. at 465. Underlying the opinion of
Tateo is Justice Harlan's belief that the defendant in Tateo was guilty in fact; "Correspond-
ing to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one
whose guilt is clear." Id. at 466.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d at 1315-16, where the defendant ar-
gued that the trial court judge declared the mistrial for personal reasons, not at the defen-
dant's request. The Circuit Court responded that "this court will not review the mental
processes of a judge. A judge's statement of his mental processes is absolutely unreview-
able." Id. at 1316. There may be so few cases due to the inability to prove the intent of a
trial court judge.
116. Since a trial court judge's findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
see text accompanying note 97 supra, it is assumed that if the trial court judge did not
grant the motion for mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial overreaching, the misconduct
did not rise to the level necessary to bar retrial.
117. See note 113 supra.
118. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reasonable conclusion would be that although the defendant has
attempted to control the proceedings by his mistrial motion, denial
of that motion may determine that he can be placed in jeopardy
again, regardless of the overreaching conduct.
CONCLUSION
Commentators exploring the problem of prosecutorial miscon-
duct agree on one point - such misconduct occurs frequently.11 9
The remedy of prohibiting retrial is presently viewed by the courts
as only appropriate when the judge or prosecutor is seeking a more
favorable forum. Though this is doctrinally logical,120 it presents a
case nearly impossible to prove, and therefore, does not deter the
misconduct.
The burden of proof lies with the defendant as to the intent of
the judge or prosecutor,121 and this intent requirement serves to
partially insulate the appellate process against successful claims.
Since it is difficult to show that the prosecutor or judge wanted to
obtain another forum, claims fail.122 Attention should not be fo-
cused on such a subjective element. If the conduct repeatedly vio-
lates ethical norms, and causes the defendant to lose his right to be
judged by the first tribunal, this conduct should be deterred.
Lesser sanctions have proved completely ineffective.1 28
One Supreme Court Justice has suggested that a prophylactic
rule, such as that established in Downum v. United States,124 may
be necessary to provide courts with notice that certain conduct will
bar retrial.1 25 Downum held that retrial is barred when a mistrial
119. R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSrICE IN AmERICA 187 (1930); Alschuler, supra note 19, at
631; Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias: An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. R.v. 40 (1949); Singer,
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors - And How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. R.V. 227
(1968).
120. See test accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
123. Appellate reversal and retrial have been found by commentators to be completely
ineffective in controlling prosecutorial misconduct. "Appellate justices time and time again
have condemned poor conduct and warned prosecutors to keep within the bounds of propri-
ety. Later opinions reflect the result - frustrating failure." Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion:
A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 487 (1959). See Alschuler, supra note 19, at
629.
124. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
125. Downum may perhaps be read as stating a prophylactic rule. While the evil
to be avoided is the intentional manipulation by the prosecutor of the availabil-
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is declared because a crucial prosecution witness is unable to tes-
tify.126 The holding of Downum has given notice to the lower
courts and still serves as a prophylactic rule, barring retrial on
these facts. Unfortunately, the present Court appears unwilling to
pursue this course.
The interests of the defendant to be judged by his first tribu-
nal and the public in fair trials designed to end in just judgments
must be balanced by our appellate courts with a realistic eye to
what occurs all too frequently in our trial courts. "Lawless enforce-
ment of the law" by the "officials most definitely responsible for
law enforcement" causes public disrespect for the entire legal pro-
cess. 127 When judges and prosecutors violate their sworn oaths,
12 8
and engage in unethical conduct that deprives a defendant of a full
and fair trial, the defendant is not the only victim - the jurors,
spectators and the public become aware that the law can be vio-
lated with impunity in the courtroom, by those sworn to protect
and uphold it.
MARY J. FAHEY
ity of his witnesses, it may be extemely difficult to secure a determination of
intentional manipulation. Proof will inevitably be hard to come by. And the rela-
tions between judges and prosecutors in many places may make judges reluctant
to find intentional manipulation. Thus, a general rule that the absence of crucial
prosecution witnesses is not a reason for declaring a mistrial is necessary. Al-
though the abuses of misdrawing indictments are less apparent than those of
manipulating the availability of witnesses, I believe that ... a similar prophy-
lactic rule is desirable here.
Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. at 482 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. 372 U.S. at 737-38.
127. NATIoNAL Comm. ON LAW OBsFVC- AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNEsSS
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 268 (1931).
128. See A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 7-13.
"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is
to seek justice, not merely to convict."
1980]

